Not too long ago, Assad issued a “Finitiative,” that is, an initiative
to end all initiatives, calling, allegedly, for dialogue with the opposition.
Now, opposition leader Moaz Alkhatib has repaid Assad in kind by issuing his
own “Finitiative” calling, purportedly, for dialogue with the regime. Both
finitiatives were clearly designed for purposes other than those declared and
were meant primarily as acts of continued defiance, even if some failed to
detect the defiance involved in Alkhatib’s finitiative. For while, Assad’s
finitiative was meant to rally troops and consolidate support and control
rather than enter into any real dialogue with the opposition, Alkhatib’s came
as a revolutionary act meant to break a political stalemate in the ranks of the
international community and to push for a real policy to help resolve the
situation in Syria in a way commensurate with the expectation of the majority
of average Syrians from all communal and political backgrounds. Assad’s
finitiative was, then, a defensive act, a last stand of sorts. But Alkhatib’s
finitiative marked the opposition’s first real offensive on the political
front.
Monday February
4, 2013
Today’s
Death Toll: 111 martyrs, including 5
women and 4 children. 41 martyrs in Damascus and Suburbs; 23 in Aleppo; 13 in
Homs; 11 in Daraa, 6 in Deir Ezzor, 6 in Idlib; 6 in Hama and 4 in Raqqa (LCCs).
Points
of Random Shelling: 330 point, including
29 points that were shelled by warplanes, 4 points using thermal balloon bombs;
3 with thermobaric bombs and 2 points with barrel bombs, in addition, 134 were
targeted by mortar shells; 121 points by heavy caliber artillery and 37 points
by rockets (LCCs).
Clashes: 152 clashes. Successful operations include repelling attempts by
regime forces to storm Yarmouk Camp in Damascus City, and taking control of the
Wattar checkpoint in the town of Adra in Damascus Suburbs. In Aleppo, FSA rebels
continued to encircle Kueiris Military Airport, and, in Raqqa, they seized
control over the Munition depots belonging to the 17th Brigade (LCCs).
News
Syria opposition urges
Assad to respond to dialogue call "The regime must take a clear
stand (on dialogue) and we say we will extend our hand for the interest of
people and to help the regime leave peacefully," he told the Qatar-based
channel. "It is now in the hands of the regime."
Syria:
UN begins delivery of safe water supplies for 10 million people “This
shipment is very timely as supplies of chlorine in Syria have fallen
dangerously low, making access to safe water challenging for many families,”
said Youssouf Abdel-Jelil, UNICEF Representative in Syria. “This puts the
population – and children especially – at high risk of contracting diarrhoea
and other water-borne diseases.”
Captives
in Syria exchanged for rebels Viktor Gorelov and Abdessattar Hassun are
in the Russian Embassy in Damascus and were in good health, Russia's Foreign
Ministry said Monday. It added that Italian Mario Belluomo, abducted together
with them on Dec. 12, will be handed over to Italian envoys by Syria's Foreign
Ministry. The Russian Embassy wouldn't say how many captured militants were set
free in exchange for the three hostages, or offer any details about their
release, which was also reported by state-run Syrian TV.
Ahmadinejad
says war not solution in Syria "War is not the solution...A
government that rules through war - its work will be very difficult. A
sectarian war should not be launched in Syria," he told Al Mayadeen
television. "We believe that (deciding) whoever stays or goes is the right
of the Syrian people. How can we interfere in that? We must strive to achieve
national understanding, and free elections."
Israel
plans defence buffer inside Syria A 10-mile strip filled with troops
and tanks is being considered to fend off Islamists should Assad fall, writes
Uzi Mahnaimi in Tel Aviv.
Israel
and Assad raise stakes on Syria With every month that passes, Syria’s
neighbours become more edgy and the risk of contagion from the conflict grows.
Though Israel is in a state of war with Syria, it has long considered the
Assads at least a predictable enemy. With Syria in chaos, and chemical and
biological weapons potentially falling into the hands of rebel groups as the
regime further loses its authority, Israel might convince itself that further
military strikes are necessary.
ANA Exclusive
European official visits A'azaz camp of Aleppo European parliament
member Koert Debeuf (ALDE GROUP) visits a camp located in A'azaz of Aleppo to
witness the humanitarian situation there. our reporter joins the official in
helping describe the scenes seen here.
Special
Reports
two ideas emerged on the sidelines of
the Munich Security Conference that could draw Russia into a more constructive
role in solving the crisis, rather than allowing it to remain an obstructionist
bystander… 1) Vice President Joe Biden is said to have proposed, in his private
meeting Saturday with Lavrov, that Russia and the United States work jointly to
maintain secure control of Syria’s chemical weapons, in the event that Assad’s
government should fall… 2) Sheik Mouaz al-Khatib, the leader of the umbrella
coalition group of the Syrian opposition, repeated Friday night in Munich his
willingness to meet with acceptable representative of the Assad regime, “to
ease the suffering of the Syrian people.”
For Syria, it is likely too late.
Notwithstanding something sudden and entirely unexpected, the international
community will not intervene. That does not mean that the Syrian people are
doomed. They will likely "win" in the end, but their victory, if we
can even call it that, will have come at a much greater cost - in the sheer
number killed - than was necessary. It will have come at the cost of a country
destroyed, of sects polarized beyond any hope of reconciliation, of Salafis and
Jihadists ascendant, of a state too torn and divided for real governance.
Whether or not the United States
should have established a red line over the movement and use of Syrian chemical
weapons is now an academic question; the issue at play yet again for the
current administration in regards to foreign policy is national credibility. If
a red line can be cavalierly declared, and then shifted for convenience, then
it is no red line at all. It is worse to declare such and not fulfill national
obligation than not to have done anything in the first place.
Her fame has spread throughout Aleppo.
Her comrades have nicknamed her 'Guevara', but to many of the city's residents
she is known simply as: 'the female sniper'.
So: we speak about humanitarian aid
and the vulnerable, and we learn about mass-violence in one specific location.
Yet the media do not link what is happening in Syria to larger questions of
global politics. And, the risk, therefore, is that neither do we. We are
witnessing a critical moment in Syria. Yes, let us focus on the material and
everyday questions of ongoing violence and forced migration: tents, blankets,
water, and food. But let us not use the focus on aid as an excuse to avoid
identifying the interconnected, regional, and global factors at work. I would
like to hear more about the global arms trade. I would like to hear more about
the role of, and control over, natural resources. And I would like to see a
more sophisticated gender analysis.
"Skype was big in Libya, but it
was just kind of emerging and the conflict was shorter," said Lara
Setrakian, founder of Syria Deeply, the dedicated Syria news startup.
"Skype is now where you go first. And we've been invited into private chat
rooms, we've had some of them translated for us in real time. That is where
rebel groups are posting updates and activists inside and out are having
conversations."
The secular and nationalist spirit
that initially sparked the Syrian revolution is also still alive and well. Many
grassroots activists and religious leaders are working to forge a country that
is built on secular principles, against sectarian revenge, and supportive of equal
rights for all its citizens. Even some of the sharia courts that have sprung up
to administer justice in areas the Syrian government has abandoned contain
surprising, nonsectarian trends.Whether such a movement can survive as the
uprising drags on is not yet clear. For the time being, however, these figures
embody the sliver of hope that Syria may avoid an all-out sectarian war.
After two years of sitting and
watching civilians being massacred by the people who are in charge of
protecting them, the “international community” now points at the consequences
of its own inaction. Sectarianism, terrorism, jihadist elements,
radicalization, and civil war are not inherent to Syrian society, but the
direct consequences of backing dictatorship. These are the direct consequences
of watching peaceful demonstrators being arrested and tortured, their
neighborhoods bombed, their children killed, and every big or small
non-violence initiative crushed without any country doing anything to stop the
regime, and some going out of their ways to support it. These are the direct
consequences of listening to Assad supporters chant “Bashar, or we will set
Syria on fire” and not take it seriously. Assad supporters have kept their
promise in a literal sense.
Given these factors and reports of
growing operational coordination with JN, the SIF is not a faction the Obama
administration should work with politically or militarily. According to recent
rumors, however, KAS may soon join the Supreme Military Council (SMC), an armed
affiliate of the U.S.-supported National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and
Opposition Forces (SOC). This would constrain potential U.S. efforts to help
the opposition. Even if its brigades do not join the council, the SIF is still
an important player on the ground, not only because of its fighting
capabilities, but also in terms of providing some form of proto-governance in
parts of Syria. The United States will have to contend with this reality when
deciding how it wants to approach the current state of play.
My
new paper, prepared for a briefing in Washington, D.C. that took place on
January 15, 2013, is now out and is titled “Syria
2013: Rise of the Warlords.” It should be read in conjunction with my
previous briefing “The
Shredded Tapestry,” and my recent essay “The
Creation of an Unbridgeable Divide.”
The New “Finitiative”
Even intelligent observers of the Syrian revolutionary scene seem to
oppose the recent initiative launched by Syrian opposition leader Moaz Alkhatib
calling for conditional dialogue with the Assad regime. At the heart of their
opposition lies the fear of the uncertainty that a political process brings
with it and of the potential for re-legitimization of the regime as a
byproduct. They fear that the revolution itself might be undermined and
suffocated. But their fears are misplaced.
As Alkhatib himself has clearly said in his Al-Arabiya interview (some of the main points
were covered by NBC
as well), the armed struggle will continue irrespective of his call. Indeed,
Alkhatib is under no illusion that he could stop the armed struggle nor does he
want to. That is exactly what makes him different from other figures calling
for dialogue: he endorses the dialogue and the armed struggle (not to mention nonviolent
action). As such, what he is doing can in no way undermine the revolution. The
armed struggle has become self-sustaining by now, even if arms flow remains unsteady.
Unless Alkhatib, or whoever, can at one point produce a political vision and a
plan that can be adopted by the majority of rebel leaders, then, nothing will
change. So, where is the danger to the revolution then in what Alkhatib is
doing? Opposition members need to understand is keeping pressure on the regime
on all fronts, the political, the economic and the military, is a duty and not
a choice. The rebels are doing their part, but the political opposition remains missing in
action. It’s this maligned initiative by Alkhatib that has finally put them on
the map.
Reports from various activists on the ground, and social media chatter
indicate that the average Syrian seems to have responded well to Alkhatib’s
initiative. While the emotional plea that Alkhatib made to Assad when he told
him in his Al-Arabiya interview to “look into his children’s eyes and find the
solution there” may not have an effect on Assad, and sounded all too naïve to
so many opposition members, it does seem to have hit home for many average Syrians,
further denuding Assad in the eyes of still silent segments, and adding to Alkhatib’s
credibility. Indeed, in the public eye, Alkhatib now appears as one of very few
members of the opposition who can support the revolution without being
oblivious to the suffering of the people as well.
Moreover, and to set the record straight, again, Alkhatib's initiative
is not meant to change the policies and attitudes of the Russians, Iranians and
Assad supporters, but the attitudes and policies of the American and other
western governments, by showing them there are those in the opposition with
real leadership potential, and that the Syrian Opposition Coalition can be
relied upon to produce a viable provisional government. As such, Syrian
opposition groups need to give Alkhatib more time to act and should judge the
success or failure of his initiative by the change it can produce in western
policies towards supporting the opposition and the rebels. And we don’t have to
postpone our judgment for too long. If, by May, the Obama Administration has
not adopted a more proactive attitude towards inernveion in Syria, then, we can
judge the initiative to have failed. Personally, I would still judge it as a
laudable effort that deserves to have been made, and I would still see in Moaz
a good and courageous leader for having embarked on this course and tried
something different for change.
Some may find it strange that I support Alkhatib’s initiative, because,
somehow, I am considered to be a hawk. But what I actually stand for is
adopting a set policies based on a real understanding of the Assad regime and
the realities on the ground. I have longed argued that military and political processes
are not mutually exclusive, and should not be thought of with an either/or
mentality. For unless rebels make serious military gains, including
neutralizing Assad’s airpower, no viable political process can be launched.
Moreover, no political process can be seen as credible if it is not led by
figures who can appeal to the grassroots and to the average Syrian,
irrespective of his political stands at the moment. We did not have such a
figure until Moaz Alkhatib entered the scene. The fact that many believe that U.S.
Ambassador Robert Ford played a key role in facilitating the emergence of Alkhatib
on the scene is a good argument in favor of greater U.S. involvement in support
of the opposition. Perhaps by offering military support to the rebels, the U.S.
can help empower the credible and moderate leaders emerging in their ranks as
well.
Meanwhile, one thing is clear: by failing to be more proactive, the
Obama Administration has done a lot of damage to the cause of democratic change
in Syria and the region. But course correction is still possible.
Roger Cohen makes
an excellent argument for U.S. “Intervene in Syria,” and hits it on the
head with his assertion that a “political solution cannot be achieved unless
the balance of power is altered.”
I agree with
Brahimi that there is no military solution. Syria, with its mosaic of faiths
and ethnicities, requires political compromise to survive. That is the endgame.
But this does not mean there is no military action that can advance the desired
political result by bolstering the armed capacity of the Syrian opposition,
leveling the military playing field, and hastening the departure of Assad
essential for the birth of a new Syria. Assad the Alawite will not go until the
balance of power is decisively against him…
It is time to alter
the Syrian balance of power enough to give political compromise a chance and
Assad no option but departure. That means an aggressive program to train and
arm the Free Syrian Army. It also means McCain’s call to use U.S. cruise
missiles to destroy Assad’s aircraft on the runway is daily more persuasive.
Indeed, it is about time we saw the Obama Administration endorsing such
efforts instead of blocking
them:
Last
summer, as the fighting in Syria raged and questions about the United States’
inaction grew, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton conferred privately
with David H. Petraeus, the director of the C.I.A. The two officials were
joining forces on a plan to arm the Syrian resistance.
The
idea was to vet the rebel groups and train fighters, who would be supplied with
weapons. The plan had risks, but it also offered the potential reward of
creating Syrian allies with whom the United States could work, both during the
conflict and after President Bashar al-Assad’s eventual removal.
Mrs.
Clinton and Mr. Petraeus presented the proposal to the White House, according
to administration officials. But with the White House worried about the risks,
and with President Obama in the midst of a re-election bid, they were rebuffed.
Shadi Hamid, Director of Research in the Brookings Doha Center, makes a
similar
argument:
Another unfortunate feature of the ongoing
debate was the tendency to treat the military option and the diplomatic
"alternative" as mutually exclusive. They never were. On the
contrary, they could have been pursued in parallel. In Bosnia, NATO power
forced the Serbs to the negotiating table, leading to the Dayton Accords and
the introduction of multinational peacekeeping forces. In Libya, the Qaddafi
regime showed more interest in negotiating with the opposition after military
intervention, rather than before (Within a few weeks of the NATO operation,
Qaddafi envoys were engaging in ceasefire talks).
Albeit, Hamid might be
right, perhaps, the Obama Administration is too late:
For Syria, it is
likely too late. Notwithstanding something sudden and entirely unexpected, the
international community will not intervene. That does not mean that the Syrian
people are doomed. They will likely "win" in the end, but their
victory, if we can even call it that, will have come at a much greater cost -
in the sheer number killed - than was necessary. It will have come at the cost
of a country destroyed, of sects polarized beyond any hope of reconciliation,
of Salafis and Jihadists ascendant, of a state too torn and divided for real
governance.
I have made similar
arguments in my
recent paper, still, I hope that we are both wrong, and that course
correction is still possible.
Video Highlights
Rebels bring down a helicopter gunship in Ma’arrat Al-Nouman,
Idlib (Feb 1) http://youtu.be/yYtPsqmQlZU
Rebels in Daraa City, use improvised missile launcher to target
a loyalist headquarter http://youtu.be/uIcWwDbdaSc
, http://youtu.be/J-Gg_7zK_SE As
clashes continue http://youtu.be/6OUVd-J3OIg
Rebel encirclement of the Kuweiris Military Airport, Aleppo, continues
http://youtu.be/u1c0HMx3azk
Rebels in Kafrenboudeh, Hama, try to take down a helicopter http://youtu.be/ajGEDC9axlo
In Damascus City, clashes between rebels and loyalist troops continue
in several key neighborhoods: Al-Qadam a tank pound rebel positions http://youtu.be/Sty9J9RLtPg Rebels defend
their positions using RPGs http://youtu.be/djwJXnBtrjY
Yarmouk Camp the pounding continues http://youtu.be/LWLHBybHlTw
Same in nearby Tadamon http://youtu.be/g9SFhyLyPkM
Meanwhile, aerial bombardment of Eastern Ghoutah continues: Douma
http://youtu.be/Q0ojPfw_Sy0 Locals
caught in a state of panic http://youtu.be/7_F2wOTm-_Y
Kafar Batna http://youtu.be/py0a91xskkE
Local panic http://youtu.be/gxFGwFBp1f8
Saqba http://youtu.be/d4ZqQmiC0OE
To the West, in Daraya, Damascus Suburbs, tanks continue to encircle
rebel positions http://youtu.be/vgIHePQfCv0
and the pounding of the town of Zabadani
by heavy artillery continues http://youtu.be/qpyRfdLNEFI
To the North, MiGs pound the town of Yabroud http://youtu.be/6oH1yvdDasM
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